Admiral Sir REGINALD CUSTANCE: What I should like to suggest is that no ship, however large can stand up against the fire of two or three battleships, and therefore the smaller the number of the enemy's ships, the easier and the more quickly can you defeat him, because each ship put out of action represents a larger proportion of his fleet, when it is composed of a small number of big ships. I put this forward as another view --

Admiral Sir REGINALD CUSTANCE : I say that no ship can be built so powerful that it can stand against the concentrated fire of two or three battleships, and therefore the fewer the number of ships that you have to put out of action, the easier it is to defeat your enemy.

Right Hon. Lord BRASSEY, K.C.B., D.C.L. (Past-President) My Lord Glasgow, my words shall be, and ought to be, few. We are here on these occasions to have the great advantage of hearing what the highest professional authority, and the highest naval authority have to tell us upon matters most grave from the national point of view. As a retired editor of the "Naval Annual" I have come here to listen, and to endeavour to judge the state of professional and naval opinion. I would describe myself as being of the eclectic school. I should like to see our Navy provided with every type of ship which high authority recommends that we should possess. On the value of speed, the arguments to-day are convincing. The latest experience of warfare shows that our ships should be armed with the most powerful guns, and that they should be protected adequately, and the question we have to consider is whether the guns shall be concentrated in fewer ships, or distributed among a larger number, in each case having a high speed. The weight of opinion is no doubt conclusive in favour of building a certain number of ships of the largest type. There is also a considerable weight of authority in support of the principle of distribution of the required larger number of vessels. We have had very interesting information put before us this morning with reference to the comparison of the fleets at Trafalgar, and we see how, in point of numbers, the 74-gun ships predominated in our fleet. It is interesting, looking at the ships that the year 1805, to see that the 74-gun ships were the type that were most in favour, and which we were then building in the larger number. Then there are other circumstances which are obvious. The most powerful ship that you can build is, experience has shown, venerable below the belt. The submarine, the ram, the torpedo, are as fatal to the large ship as to the ship of less size, and there are, moreover, what I may call hydrographical difficulties - the liability to strike a rock, or take the ground. Then there is the personal element, which seems to me to be one not to be put out of sight, as it is a most powerful factor. As the battleships grow in size, with a given expenditure - and expenditure can never be unlimited - they must be fewer in number, and the fewer the ships, the fewer are the commands. We have a long list of highly trained officers, and it is a matter of grave consideration how far we should go in so increasing the size of our ships as to afford to a less and less number of officers the opportunity for service to this country in war. I am much impressed with what we have heard with regard to the large size armoured cruisers, and I am convinced that class of vessel is of great value for the protection of commerce. There is only one other matter. It is interesting to see in these tables how large was the number of small vessels which were found necessary in ancient times to protect our commerce. If we should be at wear a large number of vessels would be required and I would therefore enter a caveat or protest against too rapid erasure from the Navy List of ships which have been comparatively recently built, and which, in circumstances easily conceivable, might continue to be valuable.

Sir WILLIAM WHITE, K.C.B., LL.D., F.R.S., D.Sc. (Vice-President) : Lord Glasgow and Gentlemen, when the Council decided to hold a Summer Meeting in the centenary year of Trafalgar, I ventured to suggest that the two papers which have just been read would furnish an interesting and useful discussion. Everyone who has attended to-day will admit that that anticipation has been fulfilled. The Transactions of The Institution will be the more valuable because of the presence therein of these papers, and the remarks that have been passed upon them. To my friend, Sir Philip Watts, our thanks are especially due because he willingly accepted the invitation of the Council to put together this great mass of most interesting historical facts; and when one knows what his work involves, even granting that he had all possible assistance it must have been a great effort to turn his mind aside from the present to the past, and to give us this excellent summary and analysis. There are certain points in this paper which are well deserving of consideration, and there are two or three on which I would like to ask for further information, because the results hardly agree with my own investigations. For example, the metacentric height of the line-of-battle ships is said to be about 12 feet, I should think from 6 to 8 ft. nearer the truth. Then in the classification of the weights, I think it is only fair that in modern ships the weight of coal should be classed with the propelling arrangements when compared with earlier ships; but the figures are most interesting and suggestive as they stand. As to cost, I wish that Sir Philip Watts had given the figures in a slightly different form, because they would have been very striking. I have done so elsewhere but if one turns to where he has given useful units of cost per ton, it will be seen how cost went up during the progress of the war. The type of ship was not sensibly changed but other circumstances led to increase in cost. There was an old rule for cost which I was taught as a boy by men who had to do with the building of these old ships. As a rough estimate of the cost of a sailing line-of-battle ship, one might take 1,000 pounds a gun. Lord Glasgow will remember that rule. That is rather in excess of the figures given in the paper. Present interest centres in the fact that whereas a first-class battleship, carrying 120 guns, could be built for 120,000 pounds, a hundred years ago, we now contemplate spending as large a sum as that on an "ocean-going destroyer," and about 270,000 pounds upon a "Scout." which carries a small number of 12-pounders. Now these figures lead me to the financial side of warship construction, and certain questions that have been discussed to-day by various naval officers, and by Lord Brassey. Under modern conditions you cannot get away from this increase of cost per unit in every class of warship. It is imposed by conditions that are inexorable and universal. Admiral Custance has very properly said that many of the problems of warship design have not been threshed out in practice in a way which leads to conclusive results. To my mind, there is great force in the argument that Admiral Custance used; and this subject deserves the most careful and thorough experiment in order to reach a settlement of all points that can be determined under peace conditions. We must all agree with that view. But the pressing and practical question is, are we to stand still until these investigations, important as they are, are completed and discussed, or are we to proceed in the best way we can having regard to the opinions of those who have the largest experience in command of modern fleets. They may not and do not always agree amongst themselves, but it is possible to ascertain at any time the balance of opinion amongst those who have had special experience in our own Navy, and to scrutinise closely what is being done elsewhere. This is obviously a matter in which our policy must be largely influenced by what is being done abroad. As matters stand, with all the uncertainties that prevail, while admitting that experiments properly conducted might remove many doubts, I for one stand fast by the opinion that in this country the principal ships - its battleships and largest cruisers - ought to be endowed with great relative individual power, and that our fleet should possess adequate numbers. I am no advocate of spending more money than is necessary on a particular ship, but having regard to all the conditions, and from a practical point of view, the only safe course for us to take in a matter upon which depends our existence as an empire, is to secure both individual power and numbers. I would also call attention to the fact that we have not yet built any class of ship that costs more than corresponding ships in foreign Navies. Sir Cyprian Bridge said, in a suggestive aside, that the smaller number of battleships now on the Royal Navy list, as compared with 1805, might be attributed in part at least to their large individual cost. I believe that is a correct statement of his remark.

Sir WILLIAM WHITE: What shall we say if we leave out of account how the individual cost of our ships stands as compared with that of foreign ships?

Sir WILLIAM WHITE : I quite agree, and I was going to add that this financial condition affects other countries even more than ourselves. So it is a question of relative standing and outlay. I would conclude by adding a short statement of fact. Captain Bacon has gone, but I wish he had been here to listen to what I am now going to say. Captain Bacon informed us that in the last design for a battleship prepared in the Admiralty, the course had been taken of consulting officers commanding fleets, and with large experience in tactics, and he appeared to think that action was novel. Now, those who are familiar with the matter will know that the Board of Admiralty, when engaged in the preparation of the Naval Defence scheme, took the opinions of officers afloat, and decided generally as to the types which should be built. The First Lord then called into council with the Board a special committee of the most eminent admirals of the period, and thus the whole series of designs, from first to last, were discussed in detail, point by point - armament, distribution of armament, endurance - by the most eminent authorities of the time. In what way has recent procedure improved upon the action of 1888-9 I entirely dissent from from the view that in any action taken recently, there has been any departure from previous Admiralty procedure.  Throughout the whole period of my service as Director of Naval Construction, every design, prepared for every type of ship was dealt with thoroughly, and approved by the Board, who had full regard to naval opinion at the time. I have seen myself credited with all sorts of opinions and all sorts of influence in regard to the types and armaments of ships for whose design I was tactics and strategy responsible; and some writers assume that every detail of of ship design is settled by the naval architect. Nothing is further from the truth. Admiralty procedure is based upon the consideration of the needs of the fleet as determined by the Board of Admiralty and the duty of the Director of Naval Construction, whoever he may be, is to assist the Board in turning their conceptions of what is necessary for the defence of the Empire, its trade and possessions, into strong, stable, and seaworthy ships. Coming to Admiral Bridge's paper, I feel some delicacy as a naval architect in venturing an opinion, on questions of tactics and strategy, but this is not a question merely of handling ships, although a naval architect must be familiar with the speeds and manoeuvring qualities of the ships, and these qualities must be considered in settling the disposition of armament. The subject of tactics and strategy, as Admiral Bridge has treated it, is largely a matter to be dealt with on the basis of past events and their analysis; and in the course of my life I have been greatly interested in this subject and have read largely on it, both in the works of early writers and those of living authorities. While I agree with Sir Cyprian Bridge that the lessons of history are invaluable it I think it is absolutely necessary in interpreting those lessons and applying them to present day conditions, to allow for the changes that have occurred; and I do not think that in this paper that has been done in all cases.

For example, the introduction of steam propulsion has had this effect. Formerly the speed and seagoing power of ships were not largely influenced by differences of size, but they are now largely influenced by such differences. In speaking of growth in size, we cannot, of coarse, forget that in the mercantile marine (where the only conditions are speed and carrying power) an increase of size has taken place far exceeding anything that has occurred in warships. In the old days small ships could keep the sea, and go anywhere under sail; they could sail as fast as the larger ships, and even faster in fair weather, they were more handy under sail; but now large speed and coal endurance cannot be obtained without large size. Then, in the old days, there was no question of protection. There was no important difference in strength of structure between wood-built ships of different sizes. Of course a brig was more lightly built than a frigate, and a frigate than a line-of-battle ship, but the differences between the strengths of structures were not important. That is no longer true; the element of protection comes in and, of course, a larger ship is necessary if there is an increase in protection. As to the capacity for carrying more powerful armament, one might do what Lord Brassey suggests, and build four small ships for the cost of three larger ones, and keep the conditions of total armament nearly the same, only distributing the guns in more ships - but you would put up the aggregate cost. Lord Brassey allowed for that in what he stated. That increased cost would have to be reckoned on, and further, with equal skill in design, there should be a greater steadiness in gun-platform with larger size. Now we come to armament. We have to deal with greater range and power of guns, and it seems to me that concentration of attack takes a new form under modern conditions. In the old days, to produce effective results, fighting had to be at close quarters, ships were therefore crowded in converging, or when the line was broken. The force was necessarily massed in limited space when the range of effective gun-fire was very moderate. With modern artillery and effective fire at ranges of three to four miles, the consideration of the space occupied by a particular ship is a very different thing from the concentration of attack at Trafalgar. Really, a concentration of gun-fire is now possible from very great distances with improved weapons, and ships so concentrating their attack may occupy a large space without mutual interference - a great contrast to that concentration in contact with the enemy, which was the ruling condition one hundred years ago. As to speed, it appears to me that until conclusive experiments are made, such as we all hope will be made soon, as suggested by Admiral Custance to-day - until that result is reached it appears to me to he desirable to have something up one's sleeve in the matter of speed. So many conditions in practice tend to degrade speed. The propelling apparatus is not always in perfect working order. Even in mercantile ships it is thought to be wise to have a good margin of boiler power; and most of us who have had to do with the actual construction of ships would say, that unless it can be shown that an entirely unreasonable price is being paid for increase of speed, it should be secured. Taking Admiral Custance`s own definition of a warship as a fighting force which has to be brought to a certain locality, he will, I feel sure, agree that very often the element of time in reaching that locality is of great importance, even if it is not of great tactical value afterwards in action. A fleet's arrival at an earlier date might be a most important element of success in a naval campaign. We now stand, according to Sir Reginald Custance, in the position that there is no absolute proof of the value of speed. He is an officer of the largest experience in the handing of fleets, and he tells us that the experiments so far made have not conclusively established one view or the other, and that he considers it is possible to reach a definite conclusion by properly conducted and well arranged, exhaustive experiments. I hope, as the result of this discussion, that an opinion of such weight, publicly expressed, will not be overlooked by the Admiralty.

Sir WILLIAM WHITE : In regard to the effect of size as a protection against under-water attacks, I was going to say a word. I hear it continually stated, but I do not think it is correct, that the big ship has no greater chance of escape than the smaller one. That cannot be true for this reason, the larger ship, if sub-division is carried out as thoroughly as in the smaller ship, must have a better chance of escape, because there is less chance of the destruction extending so far as to produce a fatal effect. In conclusion, I would point out why I think the lessons of the eighteenth century, in regard to the development of the 74-gun type, do not apply to-day, and here I am repeating the substance of a paper which has never been published, and I suppose never will be, which I wrote about thirteen years ago. "The 74-gun ships were developed at a time when the problem was to discover the ship which should be most generally useful, with certain fixed conditions of structure, armament, and propulsion." The 74-gun ship was equal in defensive power to the three-decker; her armament was less numerous, but relatively it was more powerful because the three-decker had a tier of very light guns aloft, as anyone can see who cares to look up the armament of a 74-gun ship and compare it with that of a 100 or 120-gun ship. Then the lower tier of guns in the 74-gun ship was higher above water than in the three-decker, as Sir Philip Watts says, and the guns on the lee side of the three- decker were often useless, the ports having to be kept closed, because otherwise there was danger, even with very small motion of the sea. A 74-gun ship with absolutely higher guns and narrower beam was better off and could fight longer than a three-decker. She was more handy under sail, and the comparison of the number of guns gave no fair measure of her relative force. From my reading on the subject, I conclude that the adoption of the 74-gun ship was due to the fact that her sailing qualities were superior, that she could stand blockading work better, and drew less water; therefore the type was multiplied. That may be right or wrong, but that is the result of my study of the question. Under modern conditions it is not possible to combine equal defence, the same coal endurance, and identical armament, associated with the same speed, in the smaller ship that you can secure in the larger. Until we have conclusive experimental evidence, I trust we shall keep on building ships that, individually, will be able to deal with any single enemy, and that our numbers of ships will be made adequate to all the duties to be performed.

Mr. C. E. STROMEYER (Member of Council): My Lord and Gentlemen, the discussion has, to a very large extent, drifted away from the first of the papers about the strategy and tactics of former years; but I think that a few words on that subject are desirable. Having looked through the published logs of the ships which took part in the battle of Trafalgar, I have noticed much confusion as regards the time when the action is said to have commenced. This was due, I believe, to the fact that there were no clocks on ships in those days. The time was estimated by the half-hour glass, which was started at noon whenever there was a sun, and which had to be turned every half-hour. I have prepared a table from all the recorded logs of the six most conspicuous events of the opening of the battle, viz., the French fire on either column, the two British replies, the two breakings of the line, and I find there was a difference as regards the recorded commencement of the action amounting to one full hour. The Victory and the Africa reported that Collingwood went into action about 11.30. The Britannia and the Sirius reported the same event as taking place at 12.30. All the other ships report different times. I have estimated the mean of those times, and, adopting this as a standard, have worked out in tabular form the probable times when the other ships came into action, and this table will, I think, assist in drawing a plan of the actual position of the ships. If that is done, as far as I can judge from those times, the Defiance, on Collingswood's side, arrived two hours and seven minutes after Collingwood went into action, and would thus be about three miles astern when the battle commenced. The Spartiate, on Nelson`s side, went into action two hours and thirty-one minutes after the Victory, and would be nearly four miles astern. The times in the table also show that Collingwood had 8 ships close together against 14 of the enemy, and Nelson had 6 against 12 of the enemy. After that Nelson had to wait about one hour before the next lot of his ships came up. I think that this fixing of the actual times is a matter of interest, and may help us to understand the battle which Admiral Sir E. Fremantle suggests we should study.

Mr. STROMEYER: Practically 6 ships to attack 12. I cannot give you the names now, but they can be picked out of the list which I have prepared. I have also tried to extract information from the published logs as to the positions of the English fleets before the commencement of the battle, but the result, although encouraging, is not very satisfactory. Many ships did not even log the enemy's position, and several have unquestionably made serious mistakes, while generally a difference of a point or two does not seem to have been considered of importance. Thus the Defence reports the French as being S., but probably meant E. The Conqueror probably saw them S.E., and not N.E., as logged; while the Temeraire could hardly have seen the French S.E. if the Victory was previously sighted N.N.W. Even after making allowances for these errors and shifting ships` positions by a point, so as to bring them into some reasonable order, I still found Nelson`s division in great confusion. At last it occurred to me that the reports by the Ajax, Orion, and Minotaur, that they saw the French to the eastward, might mean that they saw them in the direction of sunrise, which, on the 21st October, was almost exactly S.E. by E. (magnetic). This agrees fairly well with the Leviathan`s report that the enemy was to leeward (S.E.), and Nelson`s line would now stretch about five miles in a northerly direction. Temeraire (saw Victory N.N.W.), Victory, and Neptune saw enemy E. by S., 11 miles off; Britannia, E.S.E., 12 miles; Ajax, Orion, Minotaur, eastward (sunrise S.E. by B.); Leviathan, windward, S.E. ; and Conqueror, S.E. instead of N.E., both probably S.E. by E. Collingwood`s division, according to most of the logs, stretched about three miles in a S.W. direction. Both Admirals seem to have been close together; Nelson, as stated above, saw the French E. by S., while Collingwood saw the French from E.S.E. to E. by W., the mean being E. half S. Although these suggested positions do not agree with the sketch in Nelson`s instructions, which, however, do not deal with the possibility of a nearly calm day, they certainly do not clash with the general instruction, which was that Collingwood should place his line parallel to the enemy, while the commander-in-chief would deal with the van as he might think best. They certainly agree with the diagram in the Naval Chronicle.

Admiral Sir CYPRIAN BRIDGE : It was exhibited with the signature at the United Service Institution on the 5th of this month (July). Mr. Stromeyer also said that Nelson brought six ships to attack twelve. I think he has omitted to state that there was a great gap of over a mile long in the centre of the French line, so that Nelson really had a considerable preponderance over the ships he actually attacked. Now, going back to the remarks made by other gentlemen who have been good enough to speak, I should like to say that it has quite astonished me that statements of historical facts, which are capable of either proof or disproof by evidence which is accessible to the whole of us, should have been invariably and without exception, by every speaker, dealt with as though they were matters of opinion. My old friend, Sir Nathaniel Bowden-Smith, said he wished to speak about my views on speed on page 282 and also in the "Naval Annual." That point was taken up by several other speakers—Sir Edmund Fremantle, for instance, also spoke about speed. Now, will anybody show me in either the chapter in the "Naval Annual" or in the paper I have read to-day one single expression of opinion, or anything like it about speed ? In the "Naval Annual," it is true, I did say that speed is only one element in fighting efficiency. I hardly think that is an expression of opinion, but every other remark that was made, either here or in the "Annual" is a statement given forth as a statement of fact based upon evidence which I have got in notes which can be produced if necessary. As regards the battle of Tsushima I was careful to limit myself to what took place up to the close of 1904. I do not know whether anybody else has taken the trouble to do it, but I have collected many of the press telegrams published about the battle of Tsushima, and this has been the result of my collection of those different telegrams - that they are absolutely unintelligible without further information, and, as Sir Reginald Custance said, we really know nothing whatever about it. In some figures about the cruisers and smaller vessels in the early years of the nineteenth century Sir E. Fremantle rather differed from the figures which I gave, but I took all the ships, whereas he, I believe, took ships "in commission"

Admiral Sir CYPRIAN BRIDGE That is easily explained. Sir Philip Watts was giving grand totals. I should like to be allowed to say it was the greatest pleasure to me to hear Sir Philip Watts’ paper read. I only wish I had known that he was preparing it before my own was finished. If it is not too vain a thing to say, I should like to state my opinion that his paper and mine are to a great extent complementary of each other, and they both deal with historical facts. Captain Bacon (who, I am very sorry to see, is not here, because I should have liked him to hear my reply to his remarks) spoke of a passage as being a "further" expression of opinion. I had not expressed any opinion at all until I came to that point. I did express an opinion when I arrived there, but it was no "further expression of opinion." I should like to state my concurrence of recollection with that of Sir William White, about taking the opinion of distinguished officers on designs of ships. I was Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty at the time Sir William White spoke of, and I remember perfectly well that an officer of my department was told off to assist in noting down and putting together the opinions of the different officers, and there was not a step taken that was not fully representative of the view of the officers who were consulted. It was really quite astounding to hear from Captain Bacon that this was apparently something new; whereas it was, I presume, the old-established policy of the Admiralty. Captain Bacon said, I think, that you can use your ships of great size - it was not very easy to follow him - and that the mere size of ship can have no effect on the question.** Then, again, he said that you could as easily concentrate big ships as you could a number of small ships; but during Admiral Custance's observations he got up and said he meant an equal number of big ships against an equal number of small ships. Now was it necessary for anybody to point out that the big ships would in all probability have the better of it ? Certainly it did not occur to me to do so in my paper.*** Captain Bacon then dealt with the deductions to be drawn from the tactics of old times, and said you may sometimes draw wrong deductions. Of course you may. If two people draw different deductions they cannot both be right; but the thing is to draw the right deductions. You are just as likely to draw wrong deductions from contemporary history as you are from previous history; and I think that, considering that one’s feelings are very often moved by contemporary events, you are more likely to draw the wrong deduction from contemporary events. There is just one point I should like to clear up before I close my remarks. Captain Bacon wanted to know, when I said on page 284 “any more than we know exactly how to employ our armoured cruisers,’’ whether I meant "I" or the Service or the country. I did not mean "I." I meant the Service and the country, and Captain Bacon actually, by his own words, concurred with me. He said that it is not decided whether these armoured cruisers are to be used for trade protection or used in conjunction with the fleets. Therefore he practically, in fact, agreed exactly with what I said. In conclusion, I hope this paper will be treated as it was meant, that is, as a historical statement, whereas the discussion has almost entirely gone as though it were made up of expressions of opinion. I am quite prepared to give my opinions and to maintain and discuss them, but I have scarcely given any in this paper to-day.

**
It must be plain to everyone who has ever taken part in any discussion on speed or dimensions of ships, that those who favour very high speed and very great displacements are extremely sensitive on those points, and are usually ready to meet even a historical and undisputed statement with a vigorous rejoinder, as though an appeal to history were regarded as a controversion of their opinions. This deserves a good deal of consideration.

***
Captain Bacon and, I think, Sir William White also, spoke of concentration as though concentration of guns in a single ship were a tactical advantage. It is concentration of the effect of gun-fire, not of the guns themselves, that is tactically advantageous.