Most of the background information in this article regarding the ABM treaty and diplomatic protocol was provided by a US State Department spokesman specializing in international treaties.

In the past three weeks, the Department of Defense has conducted public meetings in Fairbanks, Delta Junction, and Anderson, to gather community testimony on the proposed deployment of up to a hundred missiles here at the top of the world. By most reports, DOD's first choice of sites for the installation is Delta Junction. The second is Anderson. There are some other options not involving Alaska at all, but they aren't very good ones from anyone's standpoint. We can safely assume that if the National Missile Defense System (NMDS) is built it will be in Alaska, and it will probably be at Fort Greely, in Delta Junction.

The stated purpose of the missiles is to protect the United States against a missile attack by a so-called "Rogue Nation." The attack would be a single, or possibly two or three relatively crude missiles, carrying nuclear warheads. Such an attack would be in the way of a "last blaze of glory;" an ultimate act of terrorism; a suicide run, since if a nuclear device made it into a US city, whatever government launched it would soon no longer exist as a political entity. So the NMDS is designed to protect not against an attack from a major power, but rather against an act of terrorism by a highly unstable and irrational government. At the present time, there are no such nations that possess missiles that can reach our shores. But defense specialists say it's possible. At the top of the list of feared nations is North Korea, which has tested an unarmed missile that made it about three quarters of the distance required to reach the US.

Anti Ballistic Missile technology is well-established, and installing an array of Interceptors capable of shooting down an incoming missile is something well within the Army's ability. The Army's ready to build it, Congress appears to be ready to pay for it, and the President is in favor of it. There's only one small problem. In 1972, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans the installation of exactly the weapons that the Defense Department is so anxious to deploy.

Before the National Missile Defense System can be built, the ABM treaty must be amended. To that end, President Clinton sent negotiators to Moscow a couple of weeks ago, to see what kind of compromise they could come up with. The Russians were adamant. Nyet, they said, and the negotiators returned to Washington empty-handed. Alaskan Senator Stevens then lashed out viciously at the Clinton Administration. Why, asked Stevens, is Clinton negotiating over a treaty we signed with a nation that no longer exists? If we made the pact with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is dissolved, then we don't have to honor anything. Several extremely strong editorials have appeared in Alaskan newspapers, including an especially vituperative one published in Anchorage Daily News "Voice of the Times." The purpose of this article is to examine the implications of taking Senator Stevens' suggestion and ignoring the ABM treaty of 1972.

The ABM treaty

In 1972, the US and Soviet Union were beginning to discuss a reduction in the arms race. By this time it was apparent to most people that there were enough nuclear weapons in the world to destroy it many times over, and the concept of winnable nuclear conflict was abstract at best. Sure, one side might prevail while the other side was annihilated, but the world the victor inherited would be mostly uninhabitable. It was, however, necessary to maintain this condition, to deter either side from mounting a preemptory first strike. For if either side ever developed the capability of overwhelming and obliterating the other without taking damage, then nuclear attack might be considered a viable option. The two countries set out to slowly unravel the complex situation in a way that could lead to reduced arms proliferation while preserving the mutual deterrence that kept them both secure.

The ABM treaty was a cornerstone of the entire non-proliferation effort, and it is still viewed as such today. Its premise was as follows: Both countries possess large numbers of long range missiles. The technology exists to detect these missiles before they arrive and intercept them. But shooting what amounts to a huge bullet out of the sky with another huge bullet might require a ratio of two, three, or more interceptors to each incoming missile. So if the countries started building Anti Ballistic Missile systems, the only way to counter them would be to build huge numbers of first-strike nuclear missiles, including ones with multiple warheads. This would require the deployment of even huger numbers of interceptors, and so on. The ABM treaty sought to preclude this build-up. If ten missiles are launched by each nation and not intercepted, ten cities are destroyed on each side. If a thousand missiles are launched by each side and ten get through on each side, the result is the same. Twenty cities die. Give-or-take a city on either side, it doesn't matter. We kill twelve, they kill eight; it's still the end of life as we know it.

So the ABM treaty was a sort of mutual throat-barring. Mutual success of the first-strike was recognized and the deterrence efforts switched to the second strike. It was here that a theoretical nuclear war could be won or lost. If one side had quicker and more deadly follow-up capability, if its submarines were well-hidden but strategically close to enemy territory, if it had large numbers of missiles constantly travelling around on rail cars, and if it maintained better communication, it could obliterate all opposition while the enemy was in disarray. To this end, the ABM treaty allowed each side to defend one location. The USSR chose Moscow. The US chose Grand Forks North Dakota, which was presumably the sight of some of our best and deadliest reserve weapons, as well as the command and communications center.

The treaty today

The ABM treaty was successful. Submarine captains had great fun playing hide-and-seek with one another, the Soviets put large numbers of missiles on rail cars, both sides went to work building more sophisticated weapons (like the neutron bomb), the US Defense Department financed the development and expansion of a brilliant communications system imbedded in the very fabric and infrastructure of society (The Internet), and the focus shifted from quantity of warheads to strategy. And though both nations have stood down somewhat, if we again become hostile, Russia is still the only country that could wipe us out 25 minutes from now. But before theirs hit, ours would be on the way, and vice-versa.

Although the cold war is ended and we're no longer enemies with the Russians, they're not ready to abandon the ABM treaty. Other efforts are under way that reduce nuclear arsenals, and someday maybe there won't be any nukes at all, but for the present the logic behind the ABM remains. In the ten years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ABM and other treaties have been honored. The State Department has identified four former USSR member-nations that are responsible for preserving nuclear treaties, and negotiating changes: Russia, Ukraine, Khasistan, and Bellaruss. There is a document making this official, but it hasn't been approved by the Senate yet, and therefore is not considered part of international law. But when the US sits down with "the Russians," these four governments sit on one side of the table and we sit on the other.

Given that we've honored our treaties for ten years, given that there's a prorocol in place for preservation of authority, and given that we are in fact negotiating with the same people we originally negotiated with, the argument that we can ignore the ABM treaty has little substance. The State Dept. spokesman we spoke to said, "I find it a curious argument now, after 10 years." Though we are fiercely protective of our sovereignty and our right to do whatever we feel is appropriate regardless of international opinion, to disregard such an important treaty would put us in an international position that we just don't want to face. There is however, a loophole; a legal way in which we can circumvent the treaty, and that' the subject of the present international debate.

Abandoning the ABM treaty

The treaty states that either side can abandon the ABM treaty "if it feels that it is in its supreme interest," and that the side that abandons the treaty must give the other side 30 days warning. So if push comes to shove, we can indeed throw over the treaty and build to our hearts' content. This is what the recent UN resolution addressed. Please, the world said, don't disregard 27 years of positive progress. The US condemned the resolution as broaching our sovereignty, but the Clinton Administration has expressed a commitment to the diplomatic process. The fact that we can abandon the treaty gives us bargaining position with the Russians, but on the other hand, if we abandon the treaty, they do too, and nobody wants a renewed arms race. The Russians claim that if we abandon the treaty it will force them to stepping up their own weapons production. Whether or not they can afford to do this is questionable, but that's the threat we face.

The US doesn't want an increased arms race with the Russians. We don't want anything at all that damages our current position of good will and cooperation. What we want to do is change our choice of the One Place we can deploy ABM's in North Dakota. We need (says the Defense Dept.) ABM's in Alaska. It's a relatively small change in the conditions. And what we want is a maximum of a hundred interceptors, while according to the State Dept, the Russians have many hundreds still in place and still functional around their chosen site of Moscow.

Hardball negotiating

International treaties are not lightly broken or disregarded, and there is an expectation among diplomats and world leaders that agreements will be honored, even when power changes hands. For instance, the agreement between Great Britain and China that deeded Hong Kong until 1997 was made with a Monarchial government that was replaced by a totalitarian government controlled by people with no ties at all to the original ruling family. Despite this discontinuity, and despite the fact that a government exists in Taiwan that some people still regard as the legitimate government of China, Britain returned Hong Kong to The People's Republic of China exactly as agreed upon so long ago.

What is the Clinton administration's commitment to the ABM treaty? If in the end the Russians say "Nyet, Nyet and for the final time, Nyet!" will the US disallow the treaty? We were unable to secure an interview with the President, or even the Secretary of State, but according to the State Department spokesman who spoke to The New Lemming, the current administration considers the ABM treaty to be a key aspect of international relations with the Russians, and is loath to abandon it. There is an expectation in the State Department that the Russians will eventually agree to amend the treaty.

Are the Russians just holding out for better concessions, or are they really worried about a hundred ABM's right next to their border? It's probably a little bit of both. By cold-war standards it changes a lot of strategic considerations if we suddenly deploy a much stronger defense array in close proximity to Russia. Their argument is that there really is no danger. Nobody has the capability of delivering a payload to the US mainland, and it's not likely anyone could develop such weapons secretly. And even if they did, the case hasn't been made that deterrence isn't enough to prevent an attack. A government is by nature self-preserving, and to launch a nuke at the US (or Russia) is sure suicide. On the other hand, North Korea is an impenetrable fortress right now. Its government has driven the populace to starvation in an all-out military build-up to the point that an invasion of any kind is out of the question unless the invader is willing to suffer heavy casualties. Who can say that a government that operates on that basis wouldn't convince itself it could get away with a nuclear strike? So the US military is understandably nervous. If the Russians can gain a few extra concessions by holding out... that's only good righteous capitalist behavior, Da?

Clinton has said he'll make his decision in June whether or not to deploy the NMDS. In the meantime we "little Americans," can relive a little bit of what it was like in the sixties. The superpowers will bluster and bluff, and the specter of renewed nuclear proliferation will loom over us as the specter of a nuclear exchange loomed for thirty years. In the end, we are in the same position that citizens have been in since the beginning of civilization. We hope our governments work it out without coming to blows, because the formula for war has never changed: young men die and women and children suffer so that old men can become rich.